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Abstract
We develop a product cycle that is much more akin to Vernon's original vision of the product
cycle, in which standardization of production techniques is required for the international
transfer of technology to the developing South. We show that, since stronger intellectual
property rights (IPR) encourages standardization and thus technology transfer, it can enhance
the long-run innovation rate in the developed North. This is because less production remains
in the North, which leaves more resources in the North for R\Dactivity. Specifically, we
show the possibility of an inverted-U relationship between IPR and innovation (and resulting
economic growth). Our result suggests that a balanced approach (not too strong and not too
weak) is required to enhance economic growth in the world economy.
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Vernon (1966), in a seminal paper that describes the natural life cycle for a typical
commodity, identiﬁed standardization of production techniques as a key element for
the international transfer of technology. Vernon (1966) argued that new goods are
initially manufactured in the country where they are ﬁrst invented (developed country,
the North). In his argument, two factors are required to shift the locus of production to
the less-developed South. One is the emergence of appropriate (dominant) designs and
the other is the standardization of production techniques.
Recently, Antr` as (2005) developed a simple theoretical model of the product cycle,
which stresses the standardization of production technology, to show that only when a
production technology is sufﬁciently standardized can it shift to the South. However,
in his model, rates of standardization and innovation are exogenous.
One contribution of our paper is to develop a product cycle model in which stan-
dardization and innovation are endogenously determined with voluntary decisions by
agents. The key feature of our model, which is only one departure from Helpman’s
(1993) product cycle model, is to allow for agents who standardize production tech-
niques developed and used by original innovators: the original innovator who invents
and introduces a new product in the North is distinguished from the agents of standard-
ization, named “standardizers.” In line with the Vernon–Antr` as model, we assume that
the South can imitate only goods that are manufactured with standardized, less costly
technologies.1
In the model, a standardizer, by incurring ﬁxed cost, invents a more efﬁcient pro-
duction method. While the patent is exclusively held by the original innovator, a suc-
cessful standardizer needs to sell his/her know-how to reduce the production cost com-
paredto that of the original innovator/patent holder. As a result of Nash bargaining, the
value for a “standardized” good is shared by the innovator and the standardizer.
We apply this model to examine the effects of intellectual property rights (IPR)
protection.2 An interesting result is that, contrary to that of Helpman (1993),3 stronger
IPR can enhance long-run rates of innovation and growth: there can be an inverted-
U relationship between IPR protection and the long-run rate of innovation. That is,
protection measures that are either too strong or too weak can discourage innovation;
rather, a balanced approach is required.
The logic behind our result is the following. Stronger IPR reduces the probability
of imitation for standardized Northern products, so that it encourages standardizers.
An increase in the number of standardized products, which are the only products that
1Vernon (1966) considers that standardization is driven by proﬁt-maximizing, voluntary decisions of
original innovators. Our model is at odds with his original view. Our view, rather, is closer to that of Arrow
(1962), who shows that an incumbent monopolist never provides new innovation in his/her own market.
Our companion paper (Akiyama and Furukawa 2006) shows similar results to the current paper in a setting
reﬂecting Vernon’s original view.
2The broader issuer of IPR protection is at the center of much of the current discussion on international
trade, innovation, and development of countries, as reﬂected, for example, in the Trade Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs) agreement. Our result suggests that stronger IPR in the South would
be good for innovation in the North if the channel for standardizing production technologies is dominant:
stronger IPR policies in the South (e.g., the TRIPs agreement) in fact may enhance innovation in the North
and thus the growth rate of the world economy.
3Helpman (1993) shows that stronger IPR always decreases the long-run rate of innovation.
1can be imitated, enhances imitation and the resulting international transfer of technol-
ogy. Therefore, less production remains in the North and Northern resource scarcity is
relaxed: more resources will be devoted to R&D activity, encouraging innovation and
growth. Allowing for standardization, we present a mechanism whereby a strengthen-
ing of IPR protection can have a positive effect on innovation.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. The next section presents a
dynamic model for a product cycle with standardization. Section 3 derives equilibrium
conditions for this economy and shows the main result.
2 The Model
Thissectionpresents thebasic model, basedonHelpman’s (1993)productcyclemodel.
Helpman (1993) constructs a two-region variety expansion model with exogenous im-
itation. Only one departure from the Helpman model allows for the presence of “stan-
dardizers,” who invent more effective production methods for the products that are
manufactured exclusively by original innovators, who ﬁrst invent and introduce the
products. We assume that the original innovators have exclusive rights to the patent, so
that a successful standardizer can earn from monopoly rents only if he/she sells his/her
know-howona moreeffective (less costly)method ofproductionthanthat ofthe patent
holder of the product (i.e., the original innovator). As a result of Nash bargaining, the
innovator and standardizer share the value of the standardized product.
As is apparent from the above, standardization of technologies is assumed to lead
to a reduction in the production cost in this model. The intuition is that a standard-
ized technology is simpler and easier to use, and thus a standardized product can be
manufactured more efﬁciently than a non-standardized one. Our view is, of course,
incomplete because it does not stress the role of the factor intensity of hi-tech inputs
(e.g., skilled labor). The literature often has identiﬁed standardization as an increase in
the intensity oflow-techinputs (see Antr` as 2005), and hence standardized products can
be manufactured with lower production costs as a result of the increased share of low-
tech (lower-priced) inputs. Nevertheless, it is useful to analyze many of the important
issues.
Time is continuous and extends from zero to inﬁnity. There exist two regions,
the innovative, developed North and the imitative, less developed South. The North
introduces new products at a endogenously determined rate, g
￿ ˙ n
￿n, where n equals
the number of products available.
2.1 Standardization
As already mentioned, we allow for the standardization of production techniques in
the model. Newly invented products are manufactured initially with a complex, unpol-
ished, hard-to-learn technology (the non-standardized technology). Assume that this
“non-standardized technology” is costly but safe: an innovator who manufactures the
good with non-standardized technology incurs a higher average cost, but he/she cannot
be imitated by the South. A non-standardized technology is assumed to require λ
￿ 1
unitsof laborperunitoutput,andhenceits marginal cost is λwN, wherewN denotes the
2wage rate for Northern labor. This view is much more akin to the Vernon–Antr` as view
of the product cycle: only when production techniques are sufﬁciently standardized
can the technology be transferred internationally. Let nN denote the number of non-
standardized products. Once an outside agent in the North (i.e., standardizer) invents a
simpler, more efﬁcient, easier-to-learn technology (the standardized technology), this
successfulstandardizer must bargainwith the patentholderofthe relevant product (i.e.,
original innovator). Let ˆ nN denote the number of Northern(yet to be imitated) products
that are manufactured with standardized technology. As is apparent from the above,
this standardized technology is less costly but risky: the producer who manufactures
using the standardized technology has a lower average cost, but he/she may be imi-
tated by the South and then lose his/her monopoly power. A standardized technology
requires one unit of labor per unit output, and its marginal cost is wN
￿ λwN.
2.2 Imitation
Following Helpman (1993),4 the South imitates Northern products at the exogenous
rate μ
￿ ˙ nS
￿ˆ nN, where nS denotes the number of products that the South knows how
to produce, while ˆ nN denotes the number of products that have been standardized and
not yet imitated by the South: nS
￿nN
￿ ˆ nN
￿ n. Then, the evolution of the number
of imitated products can be represented as ˙ nS
￿ μ ˆ nN. The rate of imitation, μ, also
represents the hazard rate of the Poisson process, at which the monopoly power of
Northern innovators with standardized technology ceases to exist on the next date.
2.3 Consumption
Individuals who live in both regions have identical preferences. An individual in re-
gion i, i
￿ S




￿ ˆ nN. At any instant, individuals choose consumption and






￿ρt lnutdt , (1)
whereρ denotesthe subjective discountfactor andlnu is the instantaneous utility func-
tion, which depends on the composite of differentiated products and has the form of a

















￿ 1 denotes the elasticity of substitution between any two products and xt
￿j
￿














4See also Lai (1998), Eaton and Kortum (1999), and Kwan and Lai (2003).
3which is the demand function exhibiting constant price elasticity, σ
￿ 1. Here pt
￿j
￿ is







￿djrepresents the aggregate spending
















which implies that real spending, E
￿P, determines the level of instantaneous utility.
A Northern consumer maximizes welfare with preference (1) and an indirect util-
ity (4) subject to a natural intertemporal budget constraint. It is well known that the






where EN represents consumption spending of Northern consumers and r N represents
the nominal rate of interest.
Following Helpman (1993), we assume that there are no ﬁnancial capital ﬂows be-
tween the two regions, so that the North ﬁnances investment in R&D entirely from
domestic savings. The trade account is therefore balanced at every point in time:
















￿ is manufactured in the North.
The South spends all of its income on consumption goods because there is no in-
vestment owing to the lack of international capital ﬂows: per capita expenditure on
consumption in the South is equal to the Southern wage rate, wS.
2.4 Production
As deﬁned above, producing one unit of non-standardized product requires one unit of
labor in the North (the marginal cost is λwN). On the other hand, the marginal cost of
producing a standardized, non-imitated product is wN, which is lower than that of the












where pN represents the price of non-standardized products and ˆ pN represents that of
standardized products. Clearly, pN
￿ ˆ pN holds.
Once the South imitates products that have been manufactured using standardized
technology, these are available to all Southern producers. Thus, imitated products are
competitively produced in the South. The price of the remaining n S products is equal
to the marginal cost in the South: pS
￿ wS.5
5We assume that ˆ pN
￿ pS holds in equilibrium to ensure that imitated products are manufactured in the
South.
4Combiningthedemandfunctionsin(3)withtheNorthernprices(6),wecanexpress











wherexN representsthe per product consumptionof a non-standardized Northern prod-
uct. Since λσ
￿1
￿ 1, the proﬁt for standardized products ˆ π is higher than that for
non-standardized products π.
3 Equilibrium
This section derives the equilibrium conditions of this economy.
In the previous section, we assume that there are no international capital ﬂows







￿dj. Using (3) and (6), we can







Let V and ˆ V denote the values of a non-standardized producer and a standardized,
non-imitated producer, respectively. The value of an innovator with non-standardized
technology V is equal to the present value of its expected streams of proﬁts. An in-
novator will bargain with a successful standardizer at probability m
￿




where the denominator is the number of non-standardized innovators and the numer-
ator, ˙ ˆ nN
￿ ˙ nS, is the gross increase in the number of standardized products, equaling
the net increase ˙ ˆ nN plus the number of standardized products that are shifted to the
South. That is, m is the hazard rate of the Poisson process, at which a non-standardized
innovator encounters a successful standardizer and, as a result of Nash bargaining, the
value of the expected stream of monopoly rents by producing the product manufac-
tured using the standardized technology is shared by the innovator and standardizer.
The reservation values of the standardizer and the innovator are, respectively, zero and
V (the original value of the innovation without standardized technology), so that, as a
result of the bargaining, they share the increase in value gained by the standardized,





￿ be the fraction that the innovator











￿: the sum of these two values is ˆ V. The parameter α
represents the strength of the innovator’s bargaining power, which might be affected,
for example, by the patent system and IPR laws.







￿ , rN ˆ V
￿ ˆ π
￿ ˙ ˆ V
￿μ ˆ V , (9)
reﬂecting the fact that only standardized products can be imitated by the South.
Assuming that innovating a new product requires 1
￿n units of labor and standard-
izing a non-standardized innovator’s technology requires b
￿n units of labor as inputs,





















5to restrict ourselves to the most interesting case, in which both innovation and stan-









Combining this relationship with Eqs. (7)–(9), the hazard rate that non-standardized














































Next, we turn to the labor market in the North: Northern labor can be used for
production for non-standardized and standardized products with size n N
￿ ˆ nN, for in-
novation (˙ n
￿ng), andforstandardization ( ˙ ˆ nN
￿ ˙ nS
￿mnN). From the demand function














where use has been made of ˙ nS
￿ μ ˆ nN.
Finally, we derive the law of motion for nS. By deﬁnition, ˙ n
￿ ˙ nN
￿ ˙ ˆ nN
￿ ˙ nS, from







The dynamic equilibrium is fully characterized by Eqs. (5) and (10)–(13). To







￿n, which denotes the fraction of products that have not been standardized,
and η
￿ ˆ nN
￿n, which denotes the fraction of products that have been standardized
but not imitated yet (which we associate with the rate of standardization). Noting
these deﬁnitions, we can reduce the equilibrium conditions (5) and (10)–(13) into the















































































￿. Note that since n0, nN
0 , and ˆ nN
0 are given as the initial conditions, ζ
and η are state variables and v is a jump variable in this system. For any initial values
that the economy inherits,
￿ζ0
￿η0




￿ that satisﬁes (14)–(17).
We are now ready to examine the effects of a strengthening of IPR protection (de-
ﬁned as a reduction in the rate of imitation, μ) on a balanced growth path (BGP). All




along a BGP. Let the BGP value of any variable y (e.g., v, ζ, η, g, etc.) be y
￿. From






















































, which is a linear increasing function in g
f
￿
￿ 0 and f
￿
￿
￿ 0. Eq. (18) determines the effect of IPR protection on the long-run
(BGP) rate of innovation. It is easy to verify that most variables (e.g., the spending of
each region, EN and ES, the numbers of non-standardized and standardized products,
nN and ˆ nN, and the wage rates of both regions, wN and wS) grow at the same rate as the
BGP rate of innovation, g
￿. Therefore, examination of the effect on g
￿ is required to
understand the long-run properties of this economy.
Eq. (18) is so complex that it is difﬁcult to analyze it analytically. We thus calcu-
lated a number of numerical examples. A representative example is depicted in Figure
1,whereweassumethat μ hasanupperboundto ensure that0
￿η
￿. Inmostexamples,
the long-run rate of innovation has an inverted U-shaped conﬁguration as a function of
μ, which is an inverse measure of IPR protection. Hence, we can show the following
proposition:
Proposition 1 Tightening of IPR protection can increase the long-run rate of innova-
tion.
Proposition 1 asserts that there exist examples for which stronger IPR enhances the
long-run rate of innovation when the protection is too strong. When it is too weak, re-
laxing IPR, conversely, encourages long-run innovation. This result contrasts sharply
with Helpman (1993), who demonstrated a negative relationship between IPR protec-
tion and long-run innovation.
The logic behind this result is easy to grasp: the key factor is standardization,
which is only one departure from the Helpman model. Stronger IPR protection (a
reduction in the rate of imitation) means that standardizers are safer from imitation,
leading to an increase in the expected monopoly rent of standardized producers. While
non-standardized producers are not affected directly by a decrease in the rate of imita-
tion, stronger IPR increases the number of products that have been standardized, which
equals the number of products that can be imitated. It follows that more production
shifts to the South owing to increased imitation. Finally, less production remains in the
North, so that more resources in the North can be devoted to R&D activity (innovation
is enhanced).
7Appendix
Derivation of Eq. (18)













































































































Substituting (19)–(21) into (14) leads to Eq. (18).
￿
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Figure 1: IPR protection and long-run innovation: a suitable parameter set is, for ex-
ample, α
￿ 0
￿8, λ
￿ 2
￿15, ρ
￿ 0
￿5, σ
￿ 5, b
￿ 0
￿1, and LN
￿ 1.
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